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Protecting Victims from Liability Insurance
Companies that Add Gratuitous Insult to
Grievous Injury
Francis J Mootz 111*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is an honor to participate in this important symposium with such an
impressive array of scholars. The symposium grew out of an Association of
American Law Schools (AALS) Annual Meeting program that charged the
speakers to develop innovative litigation strategies to advance gender justice
by holding institutional actors responsible for various forms of sex and
gender discrimination. Too frequently, the law takes an atomized approach
to tort and discrimination law-singling out the "bad actor," thereby losing
sight of the institutional and structural features that prevent gender equality.
The symposium contributors have advanced theories of liability that redress
inequalities by targeting their institutional source. This Article takes a
different tack by addressing the responsibility of an institutional player that
becomes involved only after the principal wrongdoing has occurred. The
Article argues that tort law should impose a duty in the form of litigation
norms that apply when a liability insurance carrier conducts the defense on
behalf of the actor being sued for wrongful conduct. 1
The Article begins by describing the universal black-letter common law
rule that insurance companies owe no duties to tort victims when they
control the litigation on behalf of their insured, the alleged tortfeasor. This
Article demonstrates the injustice of this rule by considering a scenario-more typical than commentators are willing to acknowledge-that illustrates

"' Dean and Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. This article was
originally presented at the 2013 AALS Annual Meeting as part of a program sponsored by the
Section on Women in Legal Education, entitled "Institutional Responsibility for Sex.and Gender

Exploitation." I would like to thank Nancy Levit for inviting me to participate on this panel, my
colleague Anne Bloom for her helpful suggestions and comments, and Chris Blau (Pacific

McGeorgeLaw,2013)for his researchassistance.
1.
This Article draws heavily from two articles that develop theories of liability for insurance
carriers that act in bad faith toward third-party claimants. See Francis J. Mootz HI, The Sounds of
Silence: Waiting for Courts to Acknowledge that Public Policy Justifies Awarding Damages to
Third-Party Claimants When Liability Insurers Deal with Them in Bad Faith, 2 Nev. L.J. 443 (2002)
[hereinafter Sounds of Silence]; Frances J. Mootz III, Holding Liability Insurers Accountable/or Bad
Faith Litigation Tactics with the Tort of Abuse of Process, 9 Conn. Ins. L.J, 467 (2003) [hereinafter
Holding liability Insurers Accountable].
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how the role of insurance may interfere with those who seek to advance the
cause of gender justice. In Part Two, the Article reviews several strategies
for holding insurance companies liable when their litigation tactics cause
additional injury to the tort victim, and then explains why these strategies
(even when taken together) are insufficient to address the institutional
structures giving rise to the injustice. The Article concludes that the
institutional problems associated with insurance defense litigation can be
addressed only by fashioning a new cause of action that sounds in tort.
IL THE INJUSTICE OF THE COMMON LAW RULE THAT LIABILITY INSURERS
OWE No DUTIES TO THIRD PARTY CLAIMANTS

A long-standing common law rule provides that a liability insurer owes
no duties in tort or contract to a third-party claimant who has been injured by
its insured.2 This stands in sharp contrast to the heightened duty of good
faith owed to its insured, a duty grounded in their contractual relationship,
but which gives rise to tort liability in some states.3 The logic of
distinguishing between the insured and the third-party claimant appears
unassailable: the insurer has contracted only with the insured, and the
primary purpose of the contract is to defend and indemnify the insured rather
than to confer a benefit on a person suing the insured.4 Imposing a tort duty
on the insurer to act in good faith toward the third-party claimant would
create an insoluble conflict by ignoring the fact that the insurer steps into the
shoes of the tortfeasor as the tort victim's litigation adversary. 5 Thus, courts
treat the liability insurer and the third-party claimant as opposed parties who
may each seek to maximize their own welfare in the litigation without regard
to the interests of the other party.
This principle is exemplified in a case involving a third-party claimant's
suit against a carrier for stonewalling payments in a case of clear liability
and documented damages. The carrier delayed payment solely to take

2.

Mootz, Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at 448-52.

3.

See generally WilliamT. Barker& RonaldD. Kent,Bad Faith in Liability Insurance, in

NEW APPLEMANON INSURANCELAW: COMMERCIALGENERALLIABILITYINSURANCEIll (Jeffrey E.

Thomas& FrancisJ. Mootz IIIeds., 2010).
4.
See, e.g., Francis v. Newton, 43 S.E.2d 282, 284 (Ga. Ct. App. 1947) ("[11he duty of the
insurancecompanyto use ordinarycare and good faithin the handlingof a claim againstits insured
arisesout of the relationshipbetweenthe insurerand the insuredcreatedby the contractor policy of
insurance,and there is no fiduciaryrelationshipor privity of contractexisting between the insurer
and a personinjuredby one of its policyholders.").

5. In the words of one court, "[a]n insurercould hardlyhave a fiduciaryrelationshipboth
with the insuredand a claimantbecause the interestsof the two are often conflicting."O.K. Lumber
Co. v. ProvidenceWash. Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 523, 526 (Alaska 1988). More directly stated, "[t)he
insurerhas a fiduciaryduty to the insuredbut an adversaryrelationshipwith the victim." Long v.
McAllister,319 N.W.2d 256, 262 (Iowa 1992).
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advantage of the practical obstacles and inconveniences caused by the fact
that the claimant resided in Maine and the accident occurred in the insured's
home state of North Carolina. Without a hint of regret or a pang of
conscience, the Maine Supreme Court concluded:
That [the] defendant [insurer] may have acted in a manner which
may have brought into play plaintiff's economic circumstances as
pressure upon plaintiff to settle for an amount less than plaintiff
believed his case was really worth does not constitute duress in
legal contemplation, either to vitiate the settlement which was
made or create an independent cause of action for damages.6
The law is not wholly callous to the interests of the claimant. Once a final
judgment triggers the liability carrier's duty to indemnify the insured, most
states provide the third-party plaintiff with the right to file a direct action
against the insurer to recover the proceeds. 7 However, during the defense of
the underlying tort action the liability insurer may aggressively avoid
judgment no less than its insured. This Article contends that the common
law rule violates clearly articulated public policy, with particularly grave
results for those who have been victimized on the basis of subordinated
characteristics such as gender.
Consider an all-too-typical litigation scenario.8 Assume that a fifteenyear-old girl participating on a swim team is repeatedly sexually assaulted
by her swim team coach. When the abuse comes to light, the girl sues the
sponsoring organization, which is insured under a Commercial General
Liability ("CGL") policy. 9 Given the nature of the allegations in the suit,
and the wording of the CGL policy, there is no legitimate basis for the
carrier to deny coverage. 10 Given the evidence adduced by the plaintiff and

6.

Linscott v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d 1161, 1164 (Me. 1977).

7.

Mootz, Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at 449-50, n.10.

8.
For another scenario emphasizing the injustice of the common law rule, see Mootz,
Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at 444-48.
9.

Paul E.B. Glad, William T. Barker & Michael Barnes, Introductionto Liability Insurance,

in NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW: COMMERCIAL
(JeffreyE. Thomas& FrancisJ. Mootz Ill eds., 20 l 0):

GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE 16·2

Most CGL policies are based on forms drafted by the Insurance Services Office, an
industry association, though insurers are free to modify ISO forms. Under those
policies, most litigation concerns Coverage A (for "bodily injury" or ''property
damage"-physical injuries) or Coverage B (for "personal injury" and "advertising
injury"-economical or intangible injuries). Coverage A requires an accidental event,
while Coverage B does not.
10.
Generally, injury suffered through intentional actions is not deemed to be within the scope
of coverage for an occurrence, but it is possible for an organization to protect itself against the
intentional acts of its agents. Many CGL policies will exclude sexual misconduct, but the wording of
the exclusion may not apply to all parties insured under the policy. See, e.g., Final Judgment &
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pleaded in her complaint, there is no legitimate basis to contest liability and
the existence of damages. Nevertheless, the litigation is contentious and lasts
for more than seven years. The insurer delays the proceedings at every
opportunity and conducts extended depositions of the victim that seek to
exploit her emotional state by delving deeply into her personal life. The
carrier instructs its lawyers-members of a large, national law firm with
substantial resources at their disposal-to refuse document requests at every
turn, suffering some sanctions as the price of wearing down the plaintiff and
her family. The litigation extends and compounds the original injury, solely
to enable the insurance carrier to minimize its payment to the victim.
Ultimately, the twenty-two-year-old woman settles the case, desperate to
bring the constant reliving of her abuse to an end. The settlement is much
lower than might be expected, but ending the litigation in itself has become
very valuable to her. If justice delayed is justice denied, how do we
characterize the claimant's protracted and painful experience in this case?
One might question whether this scenario is common in modern tort
litigation, asking "do liability insurers really act in such a craven manner on
anything approaching a regular basis?" Unfortunately these scenarios are all
too familiar. 11 Professor Feinman suggests that the problem of
Order Granting Attorney's Fees, Doe v. Johnson Cnty. Park & Recreation Dist. v. Lexington Ins. Co.
(Cir. Ct. Jackson Co. Mo. Nov. 2, 2011), Nos. 0516-CV-23636, 07-EXEC-39290, 0716-CV-2411401, available at http://muchnick.net/omaha/missourijudge.pdf
(in an order grantingattorney's fees

the court concluded that one party was an "Additional Named Insured," and therefore was not within
the scope of a sexual misconduct exclusion that applied only to "Additional Insureds," which is a

different category of insureds).
11.
The scenario is an amalgam but is primarily based on litigation across the country against
United States Swimming affiliates. See id. The description of the litigation in Doe, unfortunately, is
not unheard of. Lexington Insurance denied coverage and refused to tender a defense for the
defendants, who suffered a $5 million verdict. Id. The plaintiff then sought to recover the judgment
from Lexington, as well as attorney's fees pursuant to a Kansas statute that mandates an award when
an insurer refuses to pay without just cause. Id. After five years of litigation, the court awarded the
verdict, less setoffs, and attorneys' fees with a 1.2 multiplier. Id. The court found that Lexington
denied coverage, even while paying claims under the exact same policy on behalf of similarly
situated insureds. Final Judgment & Order Granting Attorney's Fees, ml 16-18, Doe v. Johnson
Cnty. Park & Recreation Dist. v. Lexington Ins. Co. (Cir. Ct. Jackson Co. Mo. Nov. 2, 2011), Nos.
0516-CV-23636, 07-EXEC-39290, 0716-CV-24114-01, available at http://muchn;ck.net/omaha/
missourijudge.pdf. ''The Court also notes that this has been a vigorous and contentious litigation, and
has at times crossed the line or [sic] propriety, resulting in sanctions against Lexington. In that
instance Lexington had given false representations regarding discovery matters, including payments
made." Id. at 1 25. "In the defense of this matter, Lexington has repeatedly misstated the terms of its
policies to the Court, including the very language of the sexual misconduct exclusion that Lexington
relied on to deny coverage in the underlying proceeding." Id. at 1 26. "Moreover, Special Master
Fred Wilkins describes some of Lexington's tactics in this coverage litigation as having been
'disingenuous in the extreme,' and has made 'arguments that no competent counsel could justify,'
and these view were adopted by the Court . . . . In the process, the Court has determined that
Lexington deliberately concealed evidence of the payments it made from its CGL Policies: 'The
history of the Lexington's obstructionism with respect to documentation of payments it made from
the wasting policies at issue in these proceedings leads inevitably to the conclusion that Lexington
has been attempting to hide the existence of these payments from the Judgment Creditors."' Id. at 'ii
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"intransigence" by liability earners is a growing problem in cases with
significant exposure:
There are a very significant number of large cases, probably an
increasing number in the last few years, in which liability is
relatively clear and it is also clear that the victim's damages are
substantial, yet the insurance company refuses to make an offer to
settle the case, makes a disproportionately low offer that it refuses
to raise, or makes an offer only very late in the process. 12
This phenomenon extends beyond cases with severe exposure, also
affecting high volume lines of business such as automobile liability
insurance, because in this setting a single insurer can save significant sums
of moner in the aggregate by stonewalling or denying numerous legitimate
claims. 1 It is important to understand that insurers are motivated by more
than the simple goal of reducing the amount of the verdict. As Professor
Feinman relates, tort reform legislation has served to limit exposure and
therefore reduced the risk of intransigence. Insurance carriers employ
hardball tactics to discourage the plaintiff's bar from even taking cases,
demonstrating by intransigence that they will risk taking a big hit in a few
cases that make it to trial in order to suppress the volume of litigation. 14
Further, insurers make money not just on underwriting but also investment,
with the result that the "float" of delaying payment on claims can be a
central part of their business strategy because it permits them to earn more
investment income with little risk of increasing overall claims payouts. 15
The allegations in a recent case brought against Allstate underscore the
degree to which insurance carriers will advance these multiple motives
through stonewalling tactics in individual cases. In Young v. Allstate Ins.
Co., the Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed the dismissal of the complaint,
construing all well pleaded facts as true. 16 The plaintiff, an eighty-five-year27. The Court concluded: "Lexington makes no effort to justify its reliance on a patently
inapplicablesexual misconductexclusion in deciding not to defend and indemnifyits insureds....
The languageof the exclusion Lexingtonrelied on in denying a defense ... was neithervague nor
ambiguous:it simply did not apply."Id. at 19.

12. JayM. Feinman,Incentives/or Litigation or Settlement in Large Tort Cases: Rejponding
to insurance Company Intransigence, 13 ROGER
WILLIAMS
U. L. REV.189, 193-94 (2008) (citing
Campbellv. State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2001), rev 'd,538 U.S. 408 (2003),
on remand, 98 P.3d 409 (Utah2004)).
13. I have analyzedthe Campbell case discussed by ProfessorJay Feinman(note 12) in terms
of the incentivesfor auto insurersto adopt intransigentpolicies across a broadspectrumof cases that
leave thirdpartyclaimantswithoutan effective remedy.See Holding Liability InsurersAccountable,
supra note I, at 475-79.
14.

Feinman,supra note 12, at 200-02.

15.

Id. at 197-202.

16.

Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 P.3d 666 (Haw. 2008).
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old woman named Priscilla Young, alleged that she was rear-ended by a
driver who fell asleep at the wheel. Young's car was destroyed, and her
injuries were severe enough to induce depression. 17 Although Young's
medical expenses alone exceeded $6,000, she was offered only $5,000 to
settle, and this offer was increased by a mere $300 before trial. 18 The
understated allegation-"Allstate was aware that Young was permanently
injured, then eighty-five years of age, and in a very vulnerable position" 19emphasizes the motives to suppress payment on this particular claim, but the
allegations brought to light a much broader course of conduct.
Allstate allegedly acted pursuant to a plan "to increase profits by over
$200,000,000.00 annually by underpaying claims and denying claimants just
and reasonable compensation" that was premised on keeping injured parties
away from attorneys and compensating them based on a computer model
rather than actual losses. 20 The seemingly irrational approach to Young's
claim was merely one manifestation of a much larger scheme to increase
profits:
If a settlement offer were not accepted or the claimant hired an
attorney, Allstate would fully litigate virtually every claim,
irrespective of its insured's liability or the real physical harm and
value of the injuries suffered by the claimant. Allstate thereby
sought to subject claimants to unnecessary and oppressive
litigation and expenses, or, in other words, "scorched-earth
litigation tactics." Allstate intended to force claimants and their
attorneys through arbitration and trial unnecessarily. For example,
if a non-binding arbitration award were anything more than
nominal, Allstate's practice was to appeal the award. The insurer
employed these tactics to discourage claimants from pursuing
injury claims. Allstate also sought to discourage attorneys from
representing claimants by creating so much work and expense that
they could not afford to advocate for a client with minor, moderate,
or sometimes even serious injuries .... The manual illustrated that
a five percent reduction in the amount paid on bodily injury claims
would yield profits of $201,000,000.00 per year. 21
In this light, the treatment of Young makes perfect-albeit perverse-sense.

Young's lawyer persevered and was able to obtain a jury verdict of

17.

Id.at671.

18.

Id. at 672.

19.

Id.

20.

Id. at 669-70.

21.

Jd.at670.
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$198,971 for the injuries she suffered in the automobile accident.22 Allstate
offered to pay $260,000 if Young would also release them of any claims
relating to Allstate's litigation tactics, but she "rejected that offer because
she wanted to 'expos[e] Allstate's misconduct on her claim and case to other
members of her community."' 23 Her zeal to hold Allstate accountable ran
headlong into the common law baseline rule that Allstate owed no duties to
her in the litigation against its insured. Young was unable to recover on
theories of abuse of process, malicious defense, and breach of good faith and
fair dealing.24 Young's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim,
dismissed at the appellate level, was remanded for further proceedings.25
The Article now examines these strategies that aggrieved parties like Young
can pursue.
Ill. STRATEGIES FOR HOLDING LIABILITY INSURERS ACCOUNTABLE FOR
BAD FAITH LITIGATION TACTICS

There are several established causes of action that can be employed by
third-party claimants against liability insurers, but each poses distinctive
problems and does not fully address the institutional reality of insurance
company intransigence. The first strategy is to hold insurance defense
counsel responsible for the litigation tactics, but this is yet another example
of going after a single bad actor rather than attacking the institutional
structure that promotes the bad behavior.26 Additionally, this strategy will
22.

Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 P.3d 666, 672-73 (Haw. 2008).

23.

Id. at 673.

24.
Id. at 675-79 (discussingabuse of process);Id. at 679-89 (discussing malicious defense);
690-93 (discussinggood faith).
25.

Id. at 687-89.

26. At least one court has recognizedthe need to look beyond the professionalobligationsof
insurancedefense counsel. In Givens v. Mullikin, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a third
partyclaimantstatesa cause of actionagainsta liabilityinsurerfor the abusesof process committed
by defense counsel "if the attorney's tortious actions were directed, commanded, or knowingly
authorizedby the insurer."75 S.W.3d 383, 390 (Tenn. 2002). The court rejected a formulaic
professional ideal in which defense counsel independentlyprovides counsel to the insured, and
acceptedthe institutionalrealityat work in such cases:
Consequently,althoughan insurerclearly lacks the right to controlan attorneyretained
to defend an insured,we simply cannotignore the practicalrealitythat the insurermay
seek to exercise actual control over its retainedattorneysin this context. ... To be
clear, our recognition of the control exercised by insurers in this context does not
condonethis practice,especially when it worksto favor the interestsof the insurerover
thatof the insured;rather,we acknowledgethis aspect of the relationshiponly because
it would be imprudentfor this Courtto hold that attorneysare independentcontractors
vis-a-vis insurers,but then to ignore the practicalrealities of that relationshipwhen it
causes injury.
Id. at 395.
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police only the most egregious outer bounds of behavior. Litigation is a full
contact sport, and if we regard insurance carriers as just another party
engaged in litigation, the awarding of sanctions against attorneys for their
excessive behavior will be too infrequent and insubstantial to deter abuse
directed by the insurance carrier. Even more important, if insurance carriers
reward attorneys fot employing "mad dog defense tactics," 27 as was alleged
28
in Young, discovery sanctions may in fact serve as a perverse badge of
honor for the defense attorneys striving to ensure a continuing relationship
with the insurance carrier that hires them and pays their fees.
Claimants have attempted to use several doctrinal strategies directly
against the insurance carrier, but narrow interpretations of these causes of
action leave third-party claimants wjthout an effective remedy when
insurance carriers attempt to prey on their vulnerability. First, some
claimants have argued that they are third-party beneficiaries of the insuring
agreement with the insured, permitting them to enforce the terms of the
insurance policy directly. 29 In some narrow situations, this strategy provides
an effective vehicle for relief. For example, when the claimant qualifies as
an unnamed insured under the policy, the claimant is able to assert bad faith
by virtue of his or her insured status. 30 Additionally, when coverage under

In a companion case, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that an insurer can be vicariously

liable under the same standard of liability when defense counsel tortiously interferes with the
prospective business relationships between tort victims and a third-party medical center. See TrauMed of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W. 3d 691 (Tenn. 2002).

27.

This is one of the frightening details of a systemic approach to underpaying claims that

was revealed in the trial of Crackel v. Allstate Ins. Co. See Rebecca Porter, Jury Punishes Allstate
for "Scorched-Earth" Tactics, 37 TRIAL 70 (Dec. 2001); David Hechler, Allstate Found Liable for
Abuse of Process, NAT'L LAWJ., Oct. 22, 2001, at Al 5. This same corporate strategy was employed
by State Fann and came to light in the famous Campbell case that was decided by the Supreme
Court because of the constitutionally "excessive" punitive damages awarded by the jury. Details of
the reprehensible behavior by State Fann is described in the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court. See
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 65 P. 3d 1134, 1148 (Utah 2001 ), rev 'd, 538 U.S.
408 (2003), on remand 98 P. 3d 409 (Utah 2004).
28.
Young alleged that Allstate attorneys were paid incentive bonuses to try cases rather than
settle them, and their performance reviews focused on whether the attorney achieved results that
were at or below the computer model of expected payout. Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 P.3d 666,
671 (Haw. 2008).
29.

See Mootz, Sounds of Silence, supra note I, at 450-51.

See, e.g., Bergerud v. Progressive Cas. Ins., 453 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1248-50 (D. Nev.
30.
2006) (uninsured motorist provision creates a "class of non-contracting 'insureds"' that amounts to a
contractual relationship between the third party claimant and the insurance company; citing cases in
other jurisdictions in support of the holding). Other jurisdictions have found that the mandatory
nature of coverage can result in the claimant being treated as an insured. See, e.g., Ennen v. Integon
Indem. Corp., 268 P.3d 277, 282 (Alaska 2012); Swain v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003 WL
22853415 (Del. Super. May 29, 2003) (allowing third-party claimant plaintiff to recover as a thirdparty beneficiary due to Delaware's statutory requirement that all drivers carry liability coverage).

In Goodson v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 89 P.3d409 (Colo. 2004), the court held that
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the policy is on an automatic, no fault basis, some jurisdictions permit the
third party claimant to enforce the policy directly. 31 Thus, in Meleski v.
Schbohm LLC, the court found that a claimant was an intended beneficiary
of the no-fault medical payments provision of the policy, recognizing that
the plaintiff's right to immediate payment did not give rise to the typical tort
scenario in which insurance carriers owe no duties to third-party
claimants.32
Aside from these specific exceptions, courts uniformly find that the
insured and carrier do not intend to benefit the typical third-party tort
claimant, at least until the point that a final judgment has been entered in
favor of the claimant. 33 Consequently, third-party tort claimants are treated
as strangers to the insurance contract, with courts regularly concluding that
third-party claimants "are not intended beneficiaries of liability policies and
are owed no direct contractual obligation by insurers. " 34 This reasoning
follows from the nature of insurance as an indemnity agreement, under
which the insurer has no obligation to make payments to the claimant until
such time as liabilii is established in the underlying tort action or a
settlement is reached. 5
an unnamed insured is accorded the same rights as a first~party claimant under a policy, and
therefore can recover for emotional distress caused by insurer refusal to pay under the policy, even
absent a showing of substantial property or economic loss. Id. at 417. Courts are careful to limit this

exception only to the aspect of available insurance coverage as to which the claimant should be
treated as an insured. See Gillette v. Estate of Gillette, 837 N.E.2d 1283, 1289 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)
("In sum, we conclude that although appellant [passenger] is an insured under the Nationwide
policy, where she seeks liability coverage for the negligence of the named insured - her husband she stands in the shoes of a third-party claimant who is not owed any contractual duty by the
insurer.").

See, e.g., Ennen v. Integon Indemn. Corp., 268 P.3d 277, 286-87 (Alaska 2012) (insurer
31.
owed duty of good faith to injured passenger with regard to the VIM claim, but not with respect to a
tort claim against the insured); Cain v. Griffin, 849 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. 2006) (slip and fall claimant
could assert third-party beneficiary status to enforce the no-fault medical payments provision under
the restaurant's liability policy, but could not assert a tort claim for bad faith); Gillette v. Estate of
Gillette, 837 N.E.2d 1283, 1289 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding that passenger was a third-party
claimant as to the negligence action, but not with respect to claims under the "Medical Payments"
and "Family Compensation" provisions).
32.

Meleski v. Schbohm LLC, 817 N.W.3d 887 (Wis. App. 2012).

33.
See, e.g., Cain v. Griffin, 849 N.E.2d 507, 515 (Ind. 2006) (holding that "a third party
beneficiary cannot sue an insurer in a tort action for the insurer's failure to deal in good faith with a
third-party beneficiary"); Rowlands v. Phico Ins. Co., 2000 WL 1092134, at *5 (D. Del. July 27,
2000) (citing Page v. Allstate Ins. Co., 614 P.2d 339, 340 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Chapell v. LaRosa,
2001 WL 58057, at *2--4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2001); Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. v. Johnson, 2011
WL 3607950, at '4-5 (S.D.W.V. Aug. 15, 2011)).
34.

Dussault ex rel. Walker-Van Buren v. AIG, 99 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).

See, e.g., Zahn v. Canadian Indcm. Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 286, 288 (Ct App. 1976).
35.
However, some courts have taken the baseline common law position that insurers owe no contractual
duties to third party claimants to extremes. In Aircraft Network. LLC v. Cessna Aircraft Co., the
corporate owner of an airplane sued Cessna after it damaged the plane during routine servicing. 2004
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Several tort theories would also plausibly apply to protect the claimant
from stonewalling and harsh litigation tactics designed to avoid or minimize
payments on valid claims. Some claimants have argued that a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress is appropriate when the insurer
harasses the claimant into abandoning the litigation. 36 Clearly, an insurer
that commits intentional torts against the third-party claimant should not be
shielded from liability under the general rule that the carrier owes no special
duties to the claimant. For example, in Dussault v. American Int'/. Group,
Inc., the court permitted the claimant to sue for intentional infliction of
emotional distress when the carrier agreed to settle the case but then refused
to pay the settlement amount until a motion to enforce the agreement was
filed, emphasizing that this narrow remedy would not interfere with the
insurance carrier's heightened relationship with its insured. 37
However, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires
WL 5050020 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2004) (trial order). The owner
which allegCC.lypromised to reimburse the owner for the cost of leasing
the repairs. Id. After a jury trial, the court entered judgment against
contract to reimburse the owner and also for fraud related to the same

also sued Cessna's insurer,
another plane for use during
the insurer for breach of a
commitments. Id. The court

awarded $210,517.66 in damages, plus exemplary damages of $750,000 in connection with the
fraud. Id. The Court of Appeals rejected the claims against the insurer on the merits, but it also held
that a third party claimant has no standing to bring common law causes of action against a liability
insurer engaged in adjusting and settling a claim for which there was admitted liability. Cessna
Aircraft Co. v. Aircraft Network, LLC, 200 S.W.3d 203, 208--09 (Tex. App. 2006), opinion vacated
and replaced by 213 S.W.3d 455, 460-61 (Tex. App. 2007). The owner appealed to the Texas
Supreme Court, but the appeal was not taken, despite an impassioned plea by the author of this
article that there was no basis in law to find a lack of standing to assert common law claims directly
against a liability insurer.
It is extremely important that this Court review the erroneous decision of the Court of

Appeals because that decision will foreclose third-party claimants from bringing suit
against insurance carriers who intentionally harm them or who form a contract directly
with them and then breach it. ... The decision below will have the effect of consigning
injured parties making a claim against an insured tortfeasor to a Kafkaesque fate: they
will be dealing with a large, sophisticated and wealthy entity that is not bound by the
common law of contract or tort that applies to every other person and entity in the State
of Texas .... The law governing the rights of third-party claimants has never pwported
to insulate liability insurance carriers from any liability for intentional torts committed
against such claimants, nor against independent contract actions that might be brought.
Yet, this surprising and dangerous result is precisely what the decision· below
countenances.
Amicus Curiae Professor Francis J. Mootz Ill's Brief, Aircraft Network LLC v. Associated Aviation
Underwriters, Inc., No. 07-0148, ii-iii (in support of petition for review) (on file with author).
36.

Mootz, Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at 464-66.

37.
The court reasoned: "Furthermore, we disagree with AJG's assertion that this ruling will
place conflicting duties upon an insurer. To an insured, an insurer owes an elevated duty of good
faith ....
But to a thirdMpartyclaimant, an insurer owes no duty-only a responsibility to refrain
from tortious acts. This narrow responsibility does not interfere with an insurer's various 'good
faith' duties to an insured, such as giving equal consideration in all matters to an insured's interests
and refraining from placing its own monetary interest above an insured's financial risk." Dussault v.
AIG, Inc., 99 P.3d 1256, 1261 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted).
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the plaintiff claimant to prove "outrageous conduct" by the insurance carrier,
a high standard that courts generally find cannot be met solely by pleading
that an insurer refused to pay a valid claim. 38 hi response to the egregious
facts alleged in Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., the Supreme Court of Hawaii held
that a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was properly
pleaded, suggesting that this tort might play an important role in policing the
conduct of insurance carriers:
A plaintiff may, however, state a claim for IIED because of his or
her relationship with the defendant. "The extreme and outrageous
character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a
position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or
apparent authority over the other or power to affect his interests."
"In this sense extreme 'bullying tactics' and other 'high pressure'
methods of insurance adjusters seeking to force compromises or
settlements" may satisfy the conduct element. ("Insurer's bad faith
refusal to make payment on the policy, coupled with its deliberate
use of 'economic coercion' (i.e., by delaying and refusing payment
it increased plaintiff's financial distress thereby coercing her to
compromise and settle) to force a settlement, clearly rises to the
level of 'outrageous conduct' to a person of 'ordinary
sensibilities."'); (noting that plaintiffs may assert an JIED claim to
hold parties liable for engaging in "outrageous bullying tactics"
intending "to force a settlement"); In fact, cases involving parties
inappropriately resolving their liability disputes actually helped
define and develop lIED .... 39
Thus, there may be some momentum toward utilizing the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress to hold liability insurers liable for outrageous
litigation conduct.
The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress is even less likely
to apply to insurance carriers refusing to settle claims in good faith. Courts
regularly assume that litigation is inherently prone to result in emotional
distress, and so they generally limit liability to situations in which a preexisting duty of some kind exists between the parties. Working from the

38.

Lee v. Travelers Cos., 252 Cal. Rptr. 468, 470 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the claimant

failed to allege with specificityacts beyond failing to pay the claim in good faith, and so the claim
for intentionalinflictionof emotionaldistress must fail because there is no allegation of behavior
that is "so extreme as to exceed all bounds of [what is] usually tolerated in a civilized community").
In Doctors' Co. Ins. Services v. Superior Ct., 275 Cal. Rptr. 674, 683-84 (Ct. App. 1990), the court
found that suborning perjury might establish requisite tort liability for the carrier on a theory of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, but then held that the absolute statutory litigation
privilege insulated the carrier from liability. See generally Mootz, Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at
465; Feinman, Insurance CompanyIntransigence, supra note 12, at 213-19.
39.

Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 P.3d 666, at 688 (Haw. 2008) (citations omitted).
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general common law rule that the carrier and claimant owe each other no
duties, courts find that there is no viable claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress when the claimant alleges litigation abuse.40
Finally, one might assume that the tort of abuse of process would most
closely fit the scenario of insurance company intransigence. However, courts
traditionally have limited the tort by requiring an act additional to the
process itself, and even modern courts that jettison this requirement erect a
strong barrier to liability for using valid process to defend a civil action
vigorously.41 Courts have refused to create an analogue to malicious
prosecution, holding that an alleged "malicious defense" of an action
generally remains outside the scope of abuse of process.42 In Young, the
court carefully examined the merits of the proposed tort of malicious defense
and concluded that it would result in a chilling effect on legitimate defenses
and would add nothing to the remedies available to claimants under rules
and statutes governing litigation and the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.43 Two judges dissented, arguing against the notion that
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress obviated the need to
recognize a tort of malicious defense, given the heightened elements of the
former:
The majority seems to suggest that, because Young has stated a
claim of IIED for which relief can be granted, we should not
recognize the tort of malicious defense, in light of the fact that the
tort of IIED offers the same remedies for her injuries as the tort of
malicious defense. Although it is clear that Young has successfully
stated claims of both IIED and malicious defense and that both
claims afford tort remedies ... there is no way of knowing in this
appeal from a HRCP Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal whether Young will
be able to prove both claims at trial. Her chances of establishing
liability are better with respect to her malicious defense claim than

40. .J{rupnickv. HartfordAccident & Jndem.Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39, 54 (Ct. App. 1994);
Messersmithv. Mid-CenturyIns. Co., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 879 (Ct. App. 1995). See generally
Mootz, Soundsof Silence, supra note 1, at 465-71.
41. See, e.g., Erie Ins. Prop.& Cas. Co. v. Johnson,No. 6:09-CV-01532 2011 WL 3607950,
*5-6 (S.D.W.V. Aug. 15, 2011); Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 P.Jd 666, 676-78 (Haw. 2008). Fm
a complete treatmentof the tort of abuse of process in this setting, see Mootz, Holding Liability
Insurers Accountable, supra note I.
See,e.g., Berterov. Nat'l. Gen. Corp., 118 Cal. Rptr.184, 190-92 (1975) (en bane). There
42.
may be some movement away from this traditionalrule. In Givens v. Muillikin, 75 S.W .3d 383
(Tenn. 2002), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a claimant may sue a liability insurer for
abuses of process committedby defense counsel "if the attorney'stortious actions were directed,
commanded, or knowingly authorizedby the insurer."Id. at 390. See generally Mootz, Holding
Liability Insurers Accountable, supra note I, at 488-518; Feinman, Insurance Company
Intransigence, supra note 12, at 219-30.

43.

Young, 198 P.3d at 679.
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with respect to her IIED claim, because, as previously stated, the
malicious defense claim would require proof of fewer facts than
the IIED claim. 44
Nevertheless, the majority refused to acknowledge the broader tort of
malicious defense, finding it "unnecessary." 45
Returning to the previous hypothetical scenario can sharpen the
preceding doctrinal discussion. The scenario demonstrates why the
traditional common law rule that insurers owe no duties to third-party
claimants results in injustices. The young woman who has endured years of
aggressive litigation tactics designed to prey on her vulnerability would have
little recourse under current law. As a true third-party to the insuring
agreement, she cannot assert contract rights under the policy until such time
as the verdict is final and the liability of the tortfeasor has been fixed.
Although certain inappropriate filings or discovery abuses might trigger
sanctions during the course of the litigation, it is highly unlikely that a court
would recognize a vigorous defense as a form of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Courts would likely conclude that by seeking a large tort
verdict, the third-party claimant has voluntarily subjected herself to the
harshness of litigation. Courts are even more hesitant to articulate a new tort
of "malicious defense" for fear that it will result in endless litigation and a
chilling effect on those haled into court to provide a vigorous defense
against the suit. In short, the dreadful experience of litigation in this matter
will be chalked up to the cost of seeking compensation by filing suit, and
any harms suffered by the third-party claimant will be deemed damnum
absque irifuria.46 This result constitutes a major structural impediment to the
goal of achieving gender justice.
IV. EFFECTUATING THE PUBLIC POLICY IN FAVOR OF PROMPT AND FAIR
SETTLEMENT BY INSURANCE CARRIERS AND AGAINST THE EXPLOITATION
OF GENDER INEQUITIES

The problem of insurance carrier abuse of third-party claimants can be
addressed properly and fully only by fashioning a new theory of tort liability
premised on the nature of the wrong. This proposal is not as radical as it
might appear, given that there is a clearly articulated public policy that
liability insurers deal fairly with claimants. Nearly every state has adopted a
variation of the Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act ("UCSPA"),

44.

Id. at 697 (Levinson,J., concurringand dissenting)(citationsomitted).

45.

Id at 686.

46.
This maxim literallymeans "loss without injury,"but essentially means that there may be
an actual injury that will not be recognized in law as a compensable (legal) injury. DAMNUNSINE
INJURIA,BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
(9th ed. 2009).
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which prohibits carriers from using a pretext to dispute claims, or forcing
claimants to litigate valid claims to coerce a low settlement.47 Insurance
carriers are heavily regulated businesses, and courts regular]?' acknowledge
their vital role in the functioning of the tort system.4 There is no
conceivable public interest in having insurers consciously underpay
legitimate claims in order to lower the costs of insurance, and certainly not
for the purpose ofbenefitting equity holders in the company.

47.

The Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act provides, in part:

§4. Unfair Claims Practices Defined:

Any of the following acts by an insurer, if conunitted in violation of Section 3,
constitutes an wifair claims practice:
A. Knowing misrepresenting to claimants and insureds of relevant facts of policy

provisions relating to coverages at issue;
C. Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation

and settlement of claims arising under its policies;
D. Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement of
claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear;
E. Compelling insureds or beneficiaries to institute suits to recover amounts due under
its policies by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in suits
brought by them;
F. Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation; [and]

L. Failing in the case of claims denials or offers of compromise settlement to promptly
provide a reasonable and accurate explanation of the basis for such actions[.]
All but four of the states have adopted a version of this Model Act. See Mootz, Holding Liability
Insurers Accountable, supra note I, at 481.
48.
Dissenting from an opinion denying relief to a claimant for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, a justice of the California Court of Appeals succinctly articulated the public
policy considerations relating to liability insurance:
It is clear, under our mandatory financial liability laws, as well as under California's
Insurance Code, that insurers exist and are allowed to do business in California not
only to provide their insureds with financial peace of mind, but to provide persons
injured by their insureds with financial recompense for their injuries in a reasonable
and good-faith manner.

[P)ublic policy mandates that insurance companies undertake the burden of fairly and
timely settling those claims as alleged here, when the insured's liability is reasonably
clear and the claimant's' damages are reasonably ascertainable and which they have
contracted to cover, for a price, rather than allowing such costs and expenses
encompassed by the claimed damages to fall on the shoulders of the injured claimants,
and, in some cases, on the doctors and hospitals whose bills will go unpaid, the welfare
systems to whom the injured parties may be forced to tum, and ultimately on the
taxpaying public.
Krupnick v. Hartford Accident. & Indem. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39, 85 (Ct. App. 1994) (Timlin, J.,
dissenting).

Protecting Victimsfrom Liability Insurance Companies

327

For a decade, California courts solved the problem of insurer abuse of
third-party claimants by inferring a private cause of action under the
UCSPA. 49 However, just ten years later the court reversed itself, after a
confusing and complex body of case law attempted to reconcile the cause of
action with ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. 50 Royal Globe
was generally rejected by other jurisdictions, although some states continue
to grant rights to third-party claimants under their UCSPA. 51
In Royal Globe, the Supreme Court acknowledged the common law rule against third49.
party rights, but held that third-party claimants could bring a private cause of action under UCSPA
because the statutory scheme clearly was designed to protect them as well as to protect insureds.
Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Butte Cnty., 592 P.2d 329, 332-34 (Cal. 1979).
50.
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 58, 64 (Cal. 1988); Mootz, Sounds of
Silence, supra note 1, at 458-60.
51.
Thirty-one states have rejected the Royal Globe strategy of interpreting state unfair claims
practices acts to provide an implied cause of action for third-party claimants. Eight states expressly
rejected the reasoning of the Royal Globe case. See A&E Supply Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 798 F.2d 669, 673-75 (4th Cir. 1986) (Virginia law); Earth Scientists v. U.S. Fid. & Guar., 619
F. Supp. 1465, 1470-71 (D. Kan. 1985); Tweet v. Webster, 610 F. Supp. 104, 105 (D. Nev. 1985);
Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 393 N.E.2d 718, 723-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Seeman v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35, 40-43 (Iowa 1982); White v. Unigaro Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014, 102021 (Idaho 1986); Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 393 N.E.2d 718, 723-25 (Ill. App. 1979); Seeman v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35, 40-43 (Iowa 1982); A&E Supply Co. v. Nationwide Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 669, 673-75 (4th Cir. 1986) (Virginia law); Kranzush v. Badger State Mut.
Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 269 (Wis. 1981). New Mexico originally rejected the Royal Globe
strategy expressly, but the Supreme Court subsequently created an exception to its 1984 Patterson
decision with respect to mandatory automobile insurance. See Patterson v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 685
P.2d 396, 397-98 (N.M. Ct. App. I 984) (holding that no private cause of action exists for third party
claimants under then-current insurance statutes). After new legislation was en.acted in 1984, the
Supreme Court interpreted the new provision to authorize a private cause of action by third-party
claimants against insurers in auto cases, given the mandatory nature of that fonn of insurance. Hovet
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 89 P.3d 69 (N.M. 2004). The limits of Hovel have been clarified in a later
decision that explained that the Court has "never recognized such a general right to sue by a stranger
to the insurance contract in the absence of such mandatory coverage." Jolley v. Associated Elec. &
Gas Ins. Services. Ltd. (AEGIS), 237 P.3d 738, 741 (N.M. 2010).
Thirteen states rejected the result reached in Royal Globe in the context of the
particularities of their own statutory scheme. See Farmer's Union Cent. Exch. v. Reliance Ins. Co.,
675 F. Supp. 1534, 1536 (D.N.D. 1987); Young v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 362 N.W.2d 844, 846---47
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Morris v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233, 234-38 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986); Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 581 (N.H. 1978); Pierzga v. Ohio
Cas. Group, 504 A.2d 1200, 1204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); Strack v. Westfield Cos., 515
N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); Fanis v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015, 1018--23
(Or. 1978); D'Ambrosio v. Pa. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 966, 969-70 (Pa. 1981),
superseded by statute on other grounds, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371 (1990); Swinton v. Chubb & Son,
Inc., 320 S.E.2d 495, 496-97 (S.C. Ct. App. !984); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 876 S.W.2d 145,
146-49 (Tex. 1994); Wilder v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 433 A.2d 309, 310 (Vt. 1981); Tank v.
State Fann Fire & Cas. Co., 686 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds,
715 P.2d 1133 (Wash. 1986); Herrig v. Herrig, 844 P.2d 487,492 (Wyo. 1992).
Two states embraced the Royal Globe approach, but in both states the courts held that a
third-party claimant must meet the statutory requirement of proving more than a single violation in
order to recover. See Klaudt v. Flink, 658 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Mont. 1983), superseded by statute,
MONT. CODEANN. § 33R18-242 (1987) (granting thirdRparty claimants a private cause of action but
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The Royal Globe experience teaches that an effective check on liability
insurance carriers requires a direct challenge to the baseline conunon law
rule that serves to shield them from third-party claimants. Rather than
attempting to shoehorn a cause of action into the UCSPA as a matter of
statutory interpretation, courts should draw from the UCSPA and many other
statutory and judicial pronouncements to articulate the public policy basis
for creating an exception to the general conunon law rule. Rather than using
an amalgam of existing tort and contract theories to protect against abusive
insurer intransigence, it makes most sense to address the public policy issue
expressly. The most direct manner for addressing the problem is to
recognize a new tort of bad faith insurance claim settlement practices in
violation of public policy. Recognizing this new tort would not expand the
scope of duties, but rather would only provide a mechanism to enforce
existing duties.

This new tort is analogous to the development of the tort of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy.52 Employers are free to exercise
wide freedom in running their businesses, but they may not use their
economic power to undermine important public policies, as would be the
case if an employer terminated an employee for refusing to conunit
53
perjury. Similarly, insurers should be permitted to litigate vigorously when
liability or damages are unclear, but clearly articulated public policy requires
them to promptly and fairly settle cases when there is no legitimate dispute.

continuing the Klaudt multiple violation requirement); Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 280
S.E.2d 252, 259-60 (W. Va. 1981), overruled on other grounds, State ex rel. State Fann Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Madden, 451 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1994).
A district court interpreted Nevada's unfair settlement claims practices act to provide an
implied cause of action for insureds, but this inteJpretation relied heavily on the Nevada legislature's
decision to grant express rights to insureds in an amendment to the act subsequent to the accrual of

the cause of action. See Crystal Bay Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 713 F. Supp.
1371, 1376-77 (D. Nev. 1989). The Crystal Bay holding has been met with some resistance and
another district court case distinguished the precedent. See Winnemucca Farms, Inc. v. Eckersell,
No. 3:05-CV-385-RAM, 2010 WL 1416881, at "'1 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2010) (finding no theory of
liability when insurer attempted to counterclaim against insured).
Finally, Kentucky permits a cause of action by third-party claimants for violations of the
unfair claims practices act, but it finds the source of the cause of action in another statute that
provides for a remedy for violations of any state statute that does not foreclose a civil remedy or
provide its own civil remedy. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 117~
18(Ky.1988).
52.
I have developed this theory in general terms. See Mootz, Sounds of Silence, supra note I,
at 476-79. The following paragraphs leading to the end of this Article summarize my more general
thesis in the context of seeking gender equity,
53. The watershed case for the development of the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy is Petermann v. Local 396, Int'/ Bhd of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959) ("The public policy of this state as reflected in the penal code ... would be seriously
impaired if it were to be held that one could be discharged [from employment] by reason of his
refusal to commit perjury.").
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It is important to emphasize that this does not place insurers in a bind, such
that they owe conflicting duties to their insured and the claimant. Rather,
liability insurers would owe consistent duties to their insured and the public
to fairly investigate, litigate and settle claims in accordance with the
insurance policy.
It also bears emphasis that the public interest is not necessarily coextensive with the personal interests of the third-party claimant, whose
primary interest in part may be to recover as much money as quickly as
possible. Liability insurers act in bad faith contrary to public policy if they
seek to avoid obligations of their insured that cannot be contested honestly
and legitimately, with the goal of using superior bargaining power to coerce
the third party claimant to accept an inadequate settlement rather than incur
the time and expense to litigate to judgment. Put somewhat differently, the
public interest is implicated when the insurer uses specious and pretextual
arguments to avoid settlement and delay payment. The measurement of harm
is found in the pressure on the third-party claimant to accept less than the
claimant could reasonably expect to receive for her injuries. The public is
injured in this case, in addition to the third-party claimant, which justifies an
exception to the standard common law rule that a liability insurer owes no
duties to third-party claimants.
Public policy is particularly implicated when the original injury
suffered by the third-party claimant occurs in the context of gender
subjugation, because the claimant is more likely to be vulnerable to the
intransigence of an insurance carrier. In a wide variety of settings courts and
legislatures have acknowledged the importance of curtailing the potential for
the judicial process to exacerbate the barriers to gender justice. 54
54.
See genera/Jy FED. R. EVID. 412(a)(I}-{2), (b)(2) (prohibiting "evidence offered to prove
that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or evidence offered to prove a victim's sexual
predisposition" but allowing the court to "admit evidence offered to prove a victim's sexual behavior
or sexual predisposition if its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any
victim" (emphasis added)). This effort to temper litigation excesses was grounded in the goal of
achieving gender justice. See Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility, and the Constitution:
Evidence Relating to a Sex Offense Complainant's Past Sexual Behavior, 44 CATI-I.U. L. R.Ev.709,
721 (1995) (explaining that "FRE 412 is intended to be extremely broad in scope. The exclusion of
the complainant's prior sexual behavior encompasses evidence suggesting her
. use of
contraceptives, the birth ofan illegitimate child, venereal disease, and 'activities of the mind, such as
fantasies or dreams.' It also is intended to exclude evidence which, although not referring directly to
sexual activities or thoughts, may have a sexual connotation for the fact-finder 'such as that relating
to the alleged victim's mode of dress, speech, or life-style."' (citations omitted)).
In criminal cases involving sexual assault, courts have protected the victim from additional
abuse in the course of the prosecution by relaxing the traditional broad interpretation of the
confrontation clause. The Supreme Court has held that "[a] State's interest in the physical and
psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least
in some cases, a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S.
836, 853 (1990); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Coty., 457 U.S. 596, 608
(1982) (holding that a ''trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis whether [exclusion of the
press and general public during testimony] is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim").

330

TheJournalof Gender,Race & Justice

(17:2014]

The young woman who suffered a grievous injury at the hands of a
swim team coach should not then be subjected to the strategies of an
insurance carrier seeking to maximize its profits by making her claim for
justice any more emotionally costly than the inherent travails of the litigation
process. My proposal for a new tort action would not be limited to such
cases, but these extreme cases should provide the motivation for courts to
restore the role of insurers within the modem tort system. At long last, courts
should acknowledge the implications that follow from the fact that liability
insurance carriers are highly regulated corporations permitted to exist only
because they serve the public interest as articulated by their governing
legislation. This acknowledgment should lead quickly to the conclusion that
the public interest in the smooth functioning of the tort-insurance system
should be enforced by adoption of a targeted common law doctrine akin to
the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Until such time,
there will be too many cases where justice is denied through the strategy of
harassment and delay.
The public interest is especially implicated in cases in which liability
insurer intransigence can exert even more influence, due to the claimant's
vulnerability as a result of gender injustice. There is no excuse for subjecting
the victims of gender injustice to a second injury at the hands of a liability
insurance carrier. By focusing on this particular context, it should be clear

This evidentiary rule is also applied in sex discrimination cases under Title VII. See FED.
R. EVID. 412, Advisory Notes (1994) (stating "Rule 412 will, however, apply in a Title VII action in
which the plaintiff has alleged sexual harassment"); Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.
2000). Cf Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 2006).
It would not be a stretch to conclude that the UCSPA statutory scheme provides an implied

exception to the ordinary norms governing civil litigation in the insurance defense context. For
example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has long been exempted from the
requirements of class certification under F.R.C.P. 23 in the interest of promoting its mission to serve
the public interest. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 324 (1980) (stating that
given "the clear purpose of Title VII, the EEOC's jurisdiction over enforcement, and the remedies
available, the EEOC need look no further than § 706 for its authority to bring suit in its own name
for the purpose, among others, of securing relief for a group of aggrieved individuals. Its authority to
bring such actions is in no way dependent upon Rule 23, and the Rule has no application to a § 706
suit"); see also Winnie Chau, Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue
and A Silver Sixpence/or Her Shoe: Dukes v. Wal-Mart and Sex Discrimination Class Actions, 12
CARDOZO
J.L. & GENDER969, 981 (2006).
These doctrinal developments reflect broader and deeper concerns about the ways in which
the civil litigation can exploit and exacerbate gender injustice. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and
Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010) (analyzing data that show the
negative impact of procedural rules on cases dealing with gender inequality); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS
L. REV. 705 (2007) (describing how summary judgment procedures perpetuate gender bias).
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that "public policy" is not a generic and empty term. Rather, it is the
lifeblood of justice that must be fully articulated and embraced in the
institutional setting of the tort-insurance system if we are to make good on
the basic premises of the civil litigation system.

